This paper studies a new class of dynamic optimization problems of large-population (LP) system which consists of a large number of negligible and coupled agents. The most significant feature in our setup is the dynamics of individual agents follow the forward-backward stochastic differential equations (FBSDEs) in which the forward and backward states are coupled at the terminal time. This current paper is hence different to most existing large-population literature where the individual states are typically modeled by the SDEs including the forward state only. The associated mean-field linear-quadratic-Gaussian (LQG) game, in its forward-backward sense, is also formulated to seek the decentralized strategies. Unlike the forward case, the consistency conditions of our forward-backward mean-field games involve six Riccati and force rate equations. Moreover, their initial and terminal conditions are mixed thus some special decoupling technique is applied here. We also verify the ǫ-Nash equilibrium property of the derived decentralized strategies. To this end, some estimates to backward stochastic system are employed. In addition, due to the adaptiveness requirement to forward-backward system, our arguments here are not parallel to those in its forward case.
Introduction
The controlled large-population (LP) or multi-agent (MA) systems have been widely applied in a variety of fields including biology, engineering, operational research, mathematical finance and economics, social science, etc. The most special feature of controlled LP system lies in the existence of considerable insignificant agents whose dynamics and (or) cost functionals are coupled via the state-average across the whole population. It is remarkable that the classical centralized strategies by consolidating all agent's exact states, turn out to be infeasible and ineffective due to the highly complicated coupling structure in LP system. Alternatively, it is more tractable and effective to study the related decentralized strategies by considering its own individual state and some off-line quantities only. Along this research line, one important approach is the mean-field games (see e.g., [15] ) which enables us to obtain the decentralized strategies through the limiting auxiliary tracking problem and the related consistency condition. During the last few decades, there has a growing literature to the study of mean-field games and their applications. The interested readers may refer the following partial list of recent works including [4, 5, [12] [13] [14] 16] for mean-field linear-quadratic-Gaussian (LQG) games of large-population system, [11] for mean-field games with major and minor players, [23] for risk-sensitive mean-field games. In addition, the stochastic control problems with a mean-field term in dynamics and cost functional can be found in [1, 6, 18, 28] etc.
It is remarkable that the individual states in above mentioned literature, are all formulated by (forward) stochastic differential equations (SDEs) with prescribed initial condition only. In contrast, this paper investigates the dynamic optimizations of LP system where the individual states are governed by forward-backward stochastic differential equations (FBSDEs) . Unlike the SDEs with forward state only, the solution structure of FBSDEs consists of three components: the forward state x t with given initial condition and the backward state pair (y t , z t ) with pre-specified terminal condition. In particular, the second backward component z t is actually necessary to achieve the terminal condition and ensure the adapted solution due to martingale representation. The FBSDEs have been extensively discussed in academic literature. The reader is referred to [3, 7, 21, 22, 25, 27, 31] for motivations and backgrounds of FBSDE. The forward-backward large population dynamic optimization problems arise naturally in many practical situations. One typical situation is when we consider the collective behaviors of many small agents which have the nonlinear expectation or recursive utilities (e.g., [17] ). Another typical situation is from the large population system with constrained terminal condition (see e.g., [8] ).
To our knowledge, this paper is the first try to formulate the large-population dynamic optimizations in forward-backward setting, and to investigate the related mean-field linear-quadratic-Gaussian (LQG) games. Here, the forward-backward large-population system under consideration is partially coupled in which the forward state does not explicitly depend on the backward states. The decentralized control policy is derived from the consistency condition and the approximation scheme. The ǫ-Nash equilibrium property is also verified. A simple summary to the novelties of our work is as follows. (i) Our individual states follow the forward-backward system with initial and terminal conditions; (ii) the decoupling procedure involves six Riccati and force rate equations for Hamiltonian system; (iii) the initial and terminal condition in Hamiltonian system is in the "mixed" sense (see [29] ); (iv) the verification of ǫ-Nash equilibrium applies the estimates of forward-backward system. In addition, the information structure of forward-backward LP system is different to forward LP system due to the adaptiveness requirement.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we formulate the large population LQG games of forward-backward systems. Section 3 aims to study the optimal control of auxiliary track system. The NCE consistency conditions are derived in Section 4. In Section 5, we obtain the ǫ-Nash equilibrium property of our original problem. Section 6 concludes our work.
Problem formulation
Throughout this paper, we denote by R m the m-dimensional Euclidean space. For a given Euclidean space, denote by | · | its norm. Consider a finite time horizon [0, T ] for a fixed T > 0. Suppose (Ω, F , {F t } 0≤t≤T , P ) is a complete filtered probability space on which a standard N -dimensional Brownian motion {W i (t), 1 ≤ i ≤ N } 0≤t≤T is defined. Denote by {F wi t } 0≤t≤T the filtration generated by Consider a large-population system with N individual agents, denoted by {A i } 1≤i≤N . The dynamics for individual agent involves three components. The forward components {x i } 1≤i≤N of {A i } 1≤i≤N satisfy
where
are initial conditions of the forward system (1a), and the backward states are
x i (t) is the (forward) state-average. Here, A, B, F, C, D, H, L, K, σ are scalar constants. Equation (1a) and (1b) together become a partially-coupled FBSDE, referred by (1) hereafter. By "partially-coupled", we mean the dynamics of forward state does not depend on the backward components. Introduce F t σ{W i (s), x i0 ; 0 ≤ s ≤ t, 1 ≤ i ≤ N } as the full information accessible to the LP system up to time t. Different to forward LP system, the backward diffusion term N j=1 z ij (t)dW j (t) driving by all Brownian motions (not W i only), should be introduced in the dynamics of A i by considering x (N ) t ∈ F t (even through Eq.(1a), the forward state of A i is only driven by W i only). The admissible control u i ∈ U i where the admissible set U i satisfies
the control strategies except i th agent A i . The individual cost functional is given by
where S, η are scalar constants and Q ≥ 0, R > 0, N 0 ≥ 0.
Remark 2.1 Unlike the forward LP literature, the new term of backward state N 0 y 2 i (0) is introduced in (2) to denote some recursive evaluation or nonlinear expectation. One practical meaning of it is the initial hedging deposits in the pension fund industry. In addition, one explanation of above forward-backward system (1a) and (1b) is as follows: the forward state x i in (1a) represents some underlying asset/product dynamics while the state-average x (N ) (t) denotes some average market index on it; the backward state y i denotes the dynamics of some derivative asset on x i (for example, the option on real product such as raw-oil). In this case, (2) implies the minimization of the average deviation from market price, and the initial hedging cost for some future commitment at the same time.
We introduce the following assumption:
are independent and identically distributed (i.i.d) with E|x i0 | 2 < +∞, and also independent of {W i , 1 ≤ i ≤ N }.
The Limiting Control Problem
To study Problem (I), one efficient approach is to discuss the associated mean-field games via limiting problem when the agent number N tends to infinity. As N −→ +∞, suppose x (N ) can be approximated by a deterministic functionx and introduce the following auxiliary (forward) state dynamics
and
The associated limiting cost functional becomes
Thus, we formulate the limiting LQG game (II) as follows.
Problem (II). For the
u i satisfying (5) is called an optimal control for (II). Applying the standard variational method, we have:
Lemma 3.1 Under (H1), the optimal control for Problem (II) is given bȳ
where the adjoint process (k i ,p i ,q i ) and the optimal trajectory (x i ,ŷ i ,ẑ i ) satisfy the forward SDE
and backward SDE (BSDE)
−dp
The proof is similar to that of [31] . In the following, we aim to decouple the FBSDE system (7). Let β(t) be the unique solution of the Riccati equation
α(t) the unique solution of the ordinary differential equation (ODE)
ζ(t) the unique solution of the ODE
and ξ(t) the unique solution of the ODE
Introducep
where γ(t) and τ (t) are deterministic functions to be determined. By Itô's formula, it follows that (7b) is equivalent to the following BSDEs
In terms of the existence and uniqueness of solutions of BSDEs (see [19] ), (14) is equivalent to the following equations
Note that both (15a) and (15b) are the ODEs. Letting t = 0 in (13), we havê
From (7a), we know thatk
Supposing 1 + ξ(0)N 0 = 0 and substituting (17) into (16) yield
Then computingk i (t) in (7a), we obtain the unique solution
Based on (6), (12) and (19), we can rewrite (6) and the first equation in (7a) as
Equation (21) admits a unique solutionx i (·), which together with (19) in turn determines unique solutionŝ p i (·) andŷ i (·) of equations (12) and (13), respectively. Meanwhile,q i (·) andẑ i (·) are uniquely determined by (15c) and (15d), respectively.
Remark 3.1 From (8)- (11), (15a) and (15b), it follows that (β, α, ζ, ξ) is independent of the undetermined limiting state-averagex whereas (γ, τ ) depends onx.
Remark 3.2 It is required that 1 + ξ(0)N 0 = 0. One special case is that N 0 = 0, and in this case, our problem is reduced to the forward large population problem by considering system (21) only. On the other hand, a direct calculation implies
Therefore, 1 + ξ(0)N 0 = 0 whenever N 0 > 0. In summary, 1 + ξ(0)N 0 = 0 is always true provided N 0 ≥ 0.
The Consistency Condition System
For simplicity of presentation, we introduce the following notations
|A(r)|dr ,
Note that the terms defined in (22) are not dependent onx(·). We present the following result.
, and λ = (A + 
According to [17] , we get the explicit expression of β(t) as follows
and we can see
Then we get
Based on (23), we can directly solve the ODEs (9)-(11) as follows
Thus, we obtain
In addition, we get
ds,
which yields the boundness ofΘ i , i = 1, · · · , 4. The proof is completed. For the given deterministic continuous functionx defined on [0, T ], solving the ODEs (15a) and (15b),
Now we can introduce the decentralized feedback strategy for A i as follows:
Applying the decentralized control law (28) to A i , its realized closed-loop state becomes
Taking summation of the above N equations of (29a) and dividing by N , we get
x i0 . On the other hand,
Letting N → +∞ and replacing x (N ) byx, we obtain the following limiting system
We call (27) and (31) the consistency condition system by which the limiting state-average process can be determined through the fixed-point analysis, as discussed below. Solving the ODE (31) directly and noting (24) and (27), we havē
Introduce the norm as follows: for any f (t) ∈ C(0, T ; R),
To apply the contraction mapping, hereafter we introduce the following assumption:
Then the following theorem is obtained.
Theorem 4.1 Under (H2), the map T : C(0, T ; R) → C(0, T ; R) described by (32) has a unique fixed point. Moreover, the decentralized feedback strategyū i , 1 ≤ i ≤ N in (28) is uniquely determined .
Proof. For any x, y ∈ C(0, T ; R), we have
From (H2), T defined by (32) is a contraction and has a unique fixed pointx ∈ C(0, T ; R) which is equivalently given by (31) and in turn uniquely determines γ and τ in (27) . Meanwhile, the solutions γ and τ to (15a) and (15b) are equivalently given by (27) , respectively. Thenū i is uniquely determined, which completes the proof.
Remark 4.1 (1) From Theorem 4.1, there exists a unique deterministic functionx in C(0, T ; R) to approximate the state-average of forward system. In next section, we specify more details of their difference when applying the system (31).
(2) The limit processx in forward equation (31) only involves τ (0) and γ(t). On the other hand, (27) satisfies the backward system (15a) and (15b) which actually depends onx. Thus (31) and (27) constitute a forward-backward ordinary differential equation (FBODE) system. Here, we focus on the fixed point analysis in Theorem 4.1 which provides one sufficient condition for the well-posedness of FBODE system (31) and (27) .
Remark 4.2 By Proposition 4.1, if
R is large enough and |F | is small enough (it corresponds to the weak-coupling of state-average, see e.g., [14] ), we get thatΘ 1Θ2Θ3 ,Θ 1Θ4 and R −1Θ 3 should be small enough hence (H2) follows. Remark 4.3 (1) One interesting special case is when N 0 = 0 which corresponds to the forward large population problem only. In this case, we haveΘ 1 = 0, and (H2) reads as below:
which is similar to that of [12] but noting our diffusion term in (1a) depends on state itself while in [12] the diffusion term is constant. In addition, different to (H2), (H2)' does not depend on C. This is because the dynamic system in this case is irrelevant with the backward one.
(2) Another interesting special case is when N 0 > 0 but Q = 0. In this case, the cost functional becomes
which takes into account the initial hedging cost via N 0 y 2 i (0), and we have β(t) ≡ 0 and thusΘ 3 = 0. Now (H2) reads as follows
To get a more clear result, further assume H = K = 0, AC = 0, A ± C = 0. In this case, we have A(t) ≡ A, Γ t s = e A(t−s) ,Γ = e |A|T , Θ 6 (t) ≡ 0 and α(t) ≡ 0. Then we obtain
ǫ-Nash Equilibrium Analysis
In above sections, we obtained the optimal controlū i (·), 1 ≤ i ≤ N of Problem (II) through the consistency condition system. Now we turn to verify the ǫ-Nash equilibrium of Problem (I). Due to its own forward-backward structure, our analysis here is not simple extension of that in the forward LP system. More details are as follows. To start, we first present the definition of ǫ-Nash equilibrium.
for N agents is called to satisfy an ǫ-Nash equilibrium with respect to the costs J k , 1 ≤ k ≤ N, if there exists ǫ ≥ 0 such that for any fixed
when any alternative control u ′ i ∈ U i is applied by A i . Now, we state the following result and its proof will be given later. 
forx i (·) satisfying (29a), the decentralized state trajectory for A i .
The proof of above theorem needs several lemmas which are presented later. We first introduce the optimal control and state of auxiliary limiting system as
, asx i (·) differs fromx i (·) which is the decentralized state of auxiliary system. Applyingũ i (·) for A i , we have the following close-loop system
with the cost functional
The auxiliary system (of limiting problem) is given by
We have
Proof. By (36a), we have
is given in (30) . Noting (31), we get
Thus
By (H1), we have
So (38) follows by Gronwall's inequality. Considering the difference between the decentralized and centralized states and controls, we have the following estimates:
Proof. For ∀ 1 ≤ i ≤ N, by (36a) and (37a), we get
Then (40) follows from Lemma 5.1. Noting the difference betweenũ i (·) andū i (·), (41) is obtained by (40). From (36b) and (37b), we have
Applying the basic estimate of BSDE, we get
Proof. For ∀ 1 ≤ i ≤ N, by (31) and (37a), we easily get sup
Cauchy-Schwarz inequality, we have
where the last equality is obtained by using the fact
and Lemma 5.1, 5.2. Similarly, by (41) and (42), we get
Further,
which completes the proof. Now, we already present some estimates of states and costs corresponding to controlũ i andū i ,1 ≤ i ≤ N . Our next work is to prove that the control strategies set (ũ 1 ,ũ 2 , · · · ,ũ N ) is an ǫ-Nash equilibrium for (I). For any fixed i, 1 ≤ i ≤ N , consider a perturbed control u i ∈ U i for A i and introduce
whereas other agents keep the controlũ j , 1 ≤ j ≤ N, j = i, i.e.,
l k (t). Similar to the forward system, the backward system is introduced as
while for j = i,
Ifũ i , 1 ≤ i ≤ N is an ǫ-Nash equilibrium with respect to cost J i , it holds that
Then, when making the perturbation, we just need to consider u i ∈ U i such that
where C 2 is a positive constant which is independent of N . Then we have the following proposition.
Proof. By (45a) and (45b), it holds that
and for j = i,
where C 3 is a positive constant. Thus,
By (46), we can see that
Then by Gronwall's inequality, it follows that
and for any 1
Correspondingly, the system for agent A i under control u i in (II) is as follows
and for agent A j , j = i,
coupled with the backward systems
In order to give necessary estimates in Problem (I) and (II), we introduce the intermediate states as 
Conclusions
This paper discusses the large-population (LP) LQG games with forward-backward structure. The decentralized control is derived based on the consistency condition. The ǫ-Nash equilibrium property is also verified based on the estimates of forward-backward stochastic systems. The current work also suggests some research directions for future studies. One possible direction is to investigate the fully coupled forward-backward mean-field LQG games where the forward state dynamics involves the backward states. Another direction is to study the mean-field LQG games which include the backward state average.
